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"When I was your age they would say we can become cops, or
criminals. Today, what I'm saying to you is this: when you're
facing a loaded gun, what's the difference?"2
In Martin Scorsese's The Departed, Jack Nicholson, as charmingly
sleazy crime boss Frank Costello, flawlessly delivers this
memorable gangland meditation. Although spoken in the context
of Boston's criminal underground, nowhere is this proposition
truer than in contemporary Mexico.
I. INTRODUCTION
By now, just about everyone is familiar with the incessant
violence and high death toll associated with the Mexican govern-
ment's internal drug war. A March 2010 account claims that
President Felipe Calderon's three-year affront on powerful and
ruthless drug enterprises has left nearly 18,000 people dead,3
while a source from November 2010 fixes the death count at above
31,000. 4 The uncontainable violence has even forced American
universities located in south Texas to cancel classes "because of
gunfire taking place across the Rio Grande."5
Criminal or confidential informants are instrumental to the
Mexican government's efforts to emerge victorious from the
nation's "bloodiest drug war ever," particularly since so many cor-
rupt police officers moonlight for Mexico's $25 billion drug-traf-
ficking industry.' For example, informants helped cops in
December 2009 "locate a sophisticated, 260-yard narco-tunnel
beneath Tijuana that almost reached the U.S. border."'
The story of Guillermo "Lalo" Ramirez Peyro emerges from
this backdrop. Ramirez Peyro is "a Mexican national who
informed on the powerful and violent Juarez cartel for U.S. Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement."8 As part of his duties, he wit-
nessed and tape-recorded homicides in Ciudad Juarez, a Mexican
2. THE DEPARTED (Warner Bros. Pictures 2006).
3. Alicia A. Caldwell, Ex-snitch Can't Be Deported Out of Fear of Torture, THE
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar. 24, 2010, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropoli
tan/6928299.html.
4. See Robin Emmott, Mexicans Fear Turf War After Drug Kingpin's Death,
YAHOO! NEws, Nov. 8, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/us-mexico-drugs.
5. See Gunmen, Forces Clash After Cartel Leader Killed [hereinafter Gunmen,
Forces Clash], CNN.coM, Nov. 6, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/
1/06/mexico.violence/index.html?hpt=T2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. See Tim Padgett, Mexico's Witness-Protection Program: What Protection?,
TIME, Dec. 8, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1945983,00.html.
7. Id.
8. Caldwell, supra note 2.
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city across the Rio Grande from El Paso."9 Ramirez Peyro, a for-
mer police officer, served as an informant until the 2004 discovery
of a mass grave in a Juarez backyard. 10 The United States Drug
Enforcement Administration accused Ramirez Peyro of supervis-
ing the murder of a Juarez cartel associate, but he has denied alle-
gations of participating in any murders.1 Ever since his
cooperation became an embarrassment to Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement, federal immigration authorities have been
pushing for Ramirez Peyro's deportation.'2
Suffice it to say, Ramirez Peyro's close alliance with American
authorities has not been greatly appreciated back home. "It is
undisputed that based on his work with the U.S. government
there have been two attempts on Ramirez Peyro's life." 3 An
Immigration Judge ("IJ") determined that "people within the Mex-
ican law enforcement community . . . would either harm [him]
themselves or acquiesce in placing him into a position where he
would be killed by the cartel."'4
Paying deference to these actual and supposed threats, along
with the immense influence and expansive reach of the Juarez
cartel he incriminated, Ramirez Peyro's stint as a federal drug
informant necessitates his placement into a witness-protection
program if removed to Mexico. One commentator distinguished
the state of the art of witness-protection programs in the United
States and Mexico as follows:
Thanks to movies like Goodfellas, Americans appreciate
how witness-protection programs are supposed to work. A
mobster may not be able to find decent marinara sauce
where the feds have him hiding, but in return for his testi-
mony, he can count on not getting whacked.
But then there's witness protection in Mexico - which may
as well be called witness detection, since it seems the coun-
try's violent drug traffickers are having little problem locat-
ing, and assassinating, the informants whom the





13. Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder, 574 F.3d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 2009). These two
attempts occurred on both sides of the border - one in El Paso, Texas, and the other in
Juarez, Mexico. Id. at 895-96.
14. Id. at 898 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Padgett, supra note 5.
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Unlike the comparatively sophisticated American system, Mexi-
can witness-protection programming does not assign witnesses
new identities or require them to be escorted by protective mar-
shals outside of secured areas.16 According to Mexican Attorney
General Arturo Chdvez, the untrustworthy, turncoat nature of far
too many Mexican cops stands as an institutional roadblock to
building "a proper protection apparatus." 7
Given this context, the precarious "lose-lose" situation Rami-
rez Peyro finds himself contemplating becomes evident. If he does
not become a protected witness in Mexico, drug cartel assassins
will likely track him down using their normal means and meth-
ods. If he does become a protected witness, chances are that a
corrupt official will turn over information regarding his wherea-
bouts to would-be attackers. Either way, it is more than mere
speculation to propose that Ramirez Peyro has slim chances for
survival in Mexico.
Lest the former drug informant's fate be sealed, Ramirez
Peyro may have the United States' federal courts as an ally. In
the noted case, Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals broadened its understanding of when torture is com-
mitted "in an official capacity" so as to prevent Ramirez Peyro's
removal from the United States to Mexico under legislation imple-
menting Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Tor-
ture. 6  This Note suggests that given the ineffectiveness of
Mexico's witness-protection program and other internal relocation
measures designed to protect government informants, the expan-
sive and liberal color-of-law analysis applied by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals in this and prior cases serves as a much needed
judicial palliative for Mexico's inability to adequately protect and
ensure the safety of government informants and other witnesses
needing same.
Part II of this Note depicts how the fusion of grossly inade-
quate Mexican witness-protection programs with a rapidly disin-
tegrating line of demarcation between cops and criminals has
resulted in a "lose-lose" situation for Ramirez Peyro and others
similarly situated. Part III provides a statutory background of
both the United Nations Convention Against Torture and its
respective implementing legislation in the United States. Parts
IV and V chronicle the common law development of the decisional
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See Ramirez-Peyro, 574 F.3d at 900.
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doctrines at work in Ramirez-Peyro. After the preceding sections
lay the expository foundation, Part VI summarizes the factual
posture, issue in controversy, opposing arguments, and final dis-
position of Ramirez-Peyro. Part VII praises the Ramirez-Peyro
Court's decisional criteria as the judicial formulation most consis-
tent with both the philosophical underpinnings of the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and the practical realities of
contemporary Mexican law enforcement.
II. THE MEXICAN "LOSE-LOSE" SITUATION
A. The United States Government Will Protect Me,
Right? Absolutely!
In the United States, the federal witness-protection program
is formally known as the Witness Security Program and is admin-
istered by the U.S. Marshals Service, which operates as a branch
of the U.S. Department of Justice. 9 Since the Witness Security
Program's authorization by the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970 and functional inception a year later, the U.S. Marshals
"have protected, relocated and given new identities to more than
8,200 witnesses and 9,800 of their family members."20
The package of benefits and services afforded protected wit-
nesses is so expansive that concern has existed from the outset
that the Witness Security Program is overly generous to its par-
ticipants, many of whom are former criminals themselves.2 Once
a witness is admitted into the program, the Marshals Service will:
" Obtain one reasonable job opportunity for the witness
* Provide assistance in finding housing
" Provide subsistence payments on average of $60,000 per
year
" Provide identity documents for witnesses and family
members whose names are changed for security purposes
" Arrange for counseling and advice by psychologists, psy-
chiatrists or social workers when the need has been
substantiated22
19. See Witness Security Program, U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, http://www.justice.
gov/marshals/witsec/index.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2011).
20. Id.
21. Kevin Bonsor, Living the New Life, Subpage of How Witness Protection Works,
HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://people.howstuffworks.com/witness-protection5.htm (last
visited Jan. 12, 2011).
22. Kevin Bonsor, Falling Off the Face of the Earth, Subpage of How Witness
Protection Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://people.howstuffworks.com/witness-protec
tion3.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2011).
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Furthermore, the U.S. Marshals guarantee twenty-four hour,
round-the-clock protection to all witnesses situated in high-threat
environments, which typically include pretrial conferences, trial
testimonials and appearances at other court proceedings.23
Most importantly, the Witness Security Program has been
incredibly successful at protecting witnesses who follow protocol.
According to the U.S. Marshals Service, not a single Witness
Security Program participant who adhered to security guidelines
has been harmed while under the Marshals Service's active pro-
tection.24 In addition to its pristine record, the program has
tended to have a rehabilitative effect on protected witnesses. A
recent Department of Justice study found that the recidivism rate
for Witness Security Program participants is around seventeen
percent, which is a significant improvement over the forty percent
mark for criminals paroled from prison.25
B. The Mexican Government Will Protect Me, Right?
WRONG!
The first federal witness-protection program in Mexico arose
out of the passage of the Organized Crime Law in November of
1996.26 In addition to providing for the establishment of a nation-
wide witness-protection program, the landmark Organized Crime
Law of 1996 "expanded Mexican police powers to allow for plea
bargaining, the use of informants ... and court-authorized elec-
tronic surveillance. 27
Unlike the federal Witness Security Program administered in
the United States, Mexico's witness-protection program and other
internal relocation measures are woefully inadequate to protect
government informants from the expansive reach of the criminal
enterprises they helped to prosecute. Interestingly enough, Mex-
ico's first federal witness-protection program was in many
respects the brainchild of Marisela Morales IbAfiez, whose nomi-
nation by President Calder6n for federal attorney general was
23. Witness Security Program, supra note 18.
24. Id.
25. See Kevin Bonsor, Breaking the Law in The Program, Subpage of How Witness
Protection Works, HOWSTuFFWORKS, http://people.howstuffworks.com/witness-protec
tion6.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2011).
26. See Mathieu Deflem, The Boundaries of International Cooperation: Problems
and Prospects of U.S.-Mexican Police Relations, in POLICE CORRUPTION: CHALLENGES
FOR DEVELOPED COUNTRIES - COMPARATIVE ISSUES AND COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY 93,




recently approved by the Mexican senate on April 8, 2011.28
Despite Ms. Morales' admirable efforts to restore the rule of law
through witness protection, Mexico still has no credible witness-
protection program in place.29 One commentator described the
level of protection that does exist as "meager."
30
Although Mexico certainly does not have a dearth of witness-
protection programming, assassins working for drug cartels have
encountered little, if any, difficulty tracking down and murdering
protected informants, 31 even when sequestered in fortified federal
"safe houses."32 If anything, the "cartels have a reputation for
murdering those who aid prosecutors."33
The recent assassinations of two prominent Mexican drug
informants placed in witness protection are illustrative. Edgar
Enrique Bayardo, a former high-ranking federal police official,
and Jesds Zambada Reyes, the nephew of an influential drug-car-
tel boss, were slain by hit men within two weeks of each other in
late 2009."4 Bayardo, whom federal officials confirmed as a "col-
laborating witness," reportedly provided Mexican authorities with
information on drug traffickers from the powerful Sinaloa cartel.35
According to the daily Reforma newspaper, Bayardo "moved
among a trio of government-owned safe houses" prior to his
death.3 ' Reyes, "the 22-year-old nephew of the reputed Sinaloa
drug lord Ismael 'El Mayo' Zambada, was found dead in a govern-
ment safe house in Mexico City. Authorities said he hanged him-
self, but questions swirled over whether he was coerced or killed
by cartel hit men. '37 Given this state of affairs, "witness detection"
is a more accurate description of the current system of witness
28. Alizano, Marisela Morales Becomes Mexico's New Attorney General, JUSTICE
IN MEXICO PROJECT, Apr. 14, 2011, http://justiceinmexico.org/2011/04/14/marisela-
morales-becomes-mexicos-new-attorney-general/.
29. See Brett Wolf, Mexico Sets Money-laundering Whistleblower Program,
REUTERS, Apr. 6, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/06/mexico-whistle
blower-idUSN0620658120110406.
30. Id.
31. Justin Shapiro, What Are They Smoking?! Mexico's decriminalization of
small-scale drug possession in the wake of a law enforcement failure, U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. (2010).
32. Id.
33. Wolf, supra note 28.
34. Padgett, supra note 5.
35. Ken Ellingwood, Witness in Mexico protection program killed, Los ANGELES
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protection in Mexico."
It would be improper to compare the state of witness-protec-
tion programming in Mexico and the United States without first
accounting for programmatic discrepancies in age and experience.
As the American Witness Security Program prepares to celebrate
its fortieth anniversary in 2011, its Mexican counterpart still
awaits its fifteenth birthday in November of the same year. How-
ever, the twenty-five year age gap only partially explains the com-
parative shortcomings of the Mexican regime. In other words,
witness protection, as administered in Mexico, suffers from crip-
pling institutional deficiencies.
Mexican officials openly acknowledge that their current wit-
ness-protection regime is utterly inadequate to get the job done. 9
They attribute this massive shortcoming to the untrustworthy
cops assigned to protect informants, the programmatic failure to
provide participants with new identities, and the relatively
unrestricted mobility afforded protected informants.40 For exam-
ple, Bayardo's placement in witness protection did not prevent
him from roaming freely and openly until he met his demise at a
Starbucks caf6 in a middle-class Mexico City neighborhood.4 To
the Mexican program's credit, Bayardo's conspicuous movements
may have been a breach of protocol as at the time he had recently
begun "preparing to resume normal life, perhaps by teaching
about police issues."42
Individuals receiving witness protection cannot only move
easily within Mexico, but can do so alone.43 According to Federal
Attorney General's Office spokesman Ricardo Najera, "protected
witnesses are not [currently] obliged to have bodyguards when
they leave government safe houses."" This lack of protection for
"protected" witnesses stands in stark contrast to the U.S. Mar-
shals' twenty-four hour guardianship of Witness Security Pro-
gram participants, albeit only in high-threat environments.45
38. Padgett, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. Id. The fact that Bayardo was concurrently acting as an informant for the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration at the time of his death makes his
conspicuous freedom considerably more surprising. Id.
42. Ellingwood, supra note 34.
43. See Mexico to Review Witness Protection Program [hereinafter Mexico to
Review], PUERTO Rico DAILY SuN, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.prdailysun.comindex.
php?page=news.article&id=1259821993.
44. Id.
45. See Witness Security Program, supra note 18.
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Although Bayardo was not in fact sitting alone at the Starbucks
when his attackers entered, the personal assistant that accompa-
nied him did not serve in a protective capacity.46
As a result of the Bayardo and Zambada murders, Najera said
prosecutors would consider "whether protected witnesses should
be forced to be accompanied by bodyguards, among other things.
This proposal, even if acted upon, is likely to produce dubious
results at best given the largely fraudulent and corrupt nature of
state employees. 48 Along with preexisting criticisms about the
trustworthiness of sworn accounts from confidential witnesses,49
the Mexican witness-protection program must now fend off
renewed skepticism about the ability of "Mexico's corruption-rid-
den law enforcement system" to safeguard informants at all. ° For
example, the Bayardo assassination "stoked speculation about
possible leaks by the organized-crime unit of the federal attorney
general's office, which Bayardo reportedly had been supplying
with evidence on links between the Sinaloa cartel and ranking
federal police."51
The factual findings of the Immigration Judge ("IW") in Rami-
rez-Peyro v. Holder are completely consistent with the foregoing
description of the current state of Mexican witness-protection pro-
gramming. 2 He first "found that internal relocation within Mex-
ico was not an option [for Ramirez Peyro] because of the
nationwide reach of the Cartel and its affiliates, the publicity sur-
rounding Ramirez Peyro's case, and the fact that his return to
Mexico would be known to Mexican officials based on normal
deportation procedures."5 3 Not only was the Mexican witness-pro-
tection program wholly inadequate to protect Ramirez Peyro, but
"people within the Mexican law enforcement community ... would
either harm [him] themselves or acquiesce in placing him into a
position where he would be killed by the cartel."
54
46. See Mexico to Review, supra note 42. Another source describes this companion
as a family friend. Padgett, supra note 5.
47. Mexico to Review, supra note 42.
48. See infra Part II.C.
49. Ellingwood, supra note 34.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder, 574 F.3d 893, 897-98 (8th Cir. 2009).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 898 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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C. Cops and Criminals: One and the Same
After analyzing the 2007 U.S. State Department Country
Report on Mexico, the Immigration Judge discovered a "deeply
entrenched culture of impunity and corruption in [Mexico's gov-
ernment], particularly at the state and local level."55 He high-
lighted that "Mexican 'police and security forces' had been
involved in 'unlawful killings' and that 'there were numerous
reports of executions carried out by rival drug cartels, whose
members allegedly included both active and former federal, state,
and municipal security forces."'56
In Mexico, it is not at all uncommon to observe a uniformed
police officer aiding and abetting criminality in some capacity.
This unsettling anomaly is explained by rampant, systemic cor-
ruption in the Mexican government and flagrant acts of lawless-
ness by police officers and other public officials. 7 A frighteningly
high level of police corruption pervades the entire hierarchy of
public administration in each of Mexico's 31 states. 8 This pan-
demic corruption has resulted in widespread public distrust of law
enforcement to the point where 80 percent of Mexicans firmly
believe that their law enforcement officers are corrupt.59 Even
President Calderon has not denied this reality. Since assuming
the Mexican presidency in 2006, the plague of police corruption
has forced his hand in mobilizing a significant number of military
troops nationwide to assume what would otherwise be the duties
of state police officers.6" In a move harkening back to the Zedillo
presidency,6 President Calderon enlisted the assistance of Mexi-
can naval troops on November 5, 2010 to assassinate a top leader
of the Gulf drug cartel, Antonio Ezequiel Cardenas Guillen.62 As
Cardenas' guards were armed with grenades and assault weap-
ons,63 Calderon's decision to summon his nation's marines to carry
55. Id. at 897 (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id.
57. See generally Shapiro, supra note 30, at 14-18.
58. Id. at 14.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 17.
61. Aimed at increasing the level of professionalism in Mexican law enforcement,
President Ernesto Zedillo deployed some 3,000 soldiers to direct traffic and walk the
beat in Mexico City in March 1997. See Deflem, supra note 25.
62. See Gunmen, Forces Clash After Cartel Leader Killed [hereinafter Gunmen,





out this deadly operation can hardly be characterized as an exces-
sive use of force.
As one might expect, the use of federal police to cleanse alleg-
edly corrupt local forces has been met with considerable resistance
by the latter.5 In the span of nine days in June 2009, 78 police
officers stationed in northern Nuevo Le6n state, including a local
police chief, were detained by Army troops and federal police on
suspicion of being on the payrolls of powerful Mexican drug-traf-
ficking organizations. 61 In response to this strong federal inter-
vention, colleagues of the arrested local police officers staged a
protest by blockading busy city avenues with their patrol cars.66
Lest these protesters give off the impression of righteousness,
"[s]tate officials said there were indications that drug gangs had
ordered at least some of the local police to stage the protests."67
The logical conclusion to be drawn from this familiar vignette is
that even local police officers cannot put on a dignified demonstra-
tion of solidarity; inevitably corrupt influences are the motivating
force.
Recent efforts by the Mexican federal government and army
to eliminate local police corruption have produced transient
results at best.6" According to Maureen Meyer, an analyst with
the Washington Office on Latin America, local police officers fired
as a result of federal crackdowns have been rehired in other dis-
tricts as Mexico does not maintain a national police blacklist, or
simply drop the charade altogether and "go to work full-time for
the drug traffickers."69 Even newly organized special police forces
are not immune to Mexico's well-heeled drug traffickers. 7' The
formation of the Zetas is representative of this common dilemma.
Sometime in the late 1990s, approximately forty soldiers from
army special forces began taking their marching orders from a
new employer, the Gulf cartel.7' Apparently dissatisfied with
64. See David Luhnow, Mexico Cracks Down on Local Police Corruption, THE





68. See Chris Hawley & Sergio Solache, Mexico Focuses on Police Corruption, USA




71. Robin Emmott, Mexicans Fear Turf War After Drug Kingpin's Death, YAHOO!
NEWS, Nov. 8, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/usmexicodrugs.
2011] 425
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:2
their working arrangement, the Zetas thereafter split from the
Gulf cartel in early 2010 to form an independent drug-trafficking
organization,72 and may now boast a membership of 10,000 across
Mexico and Central America. In short, some forty former
soldiers are now responsible for the emergence of a bona fide drug
cartel notorious for committing "some of the worst atrocities in the
drug war, including the murders of 72 migrants in August
[20101 .
Adalberto Santana, an author and historian at the National
Autonomous University of Mexico, asserts that officers' low pay
serves as an institutional roadblock to rehabilitating corrupt
police forces.75 This, he continues, makes local officers "suscepti-
ble to kickbacks from drug smugglers moving their cargo through
town."76 Furthermore, if mere pecuniary gain does not motivate
local and state police officers to accede or acquiesce to the inter-
ests of drug traffickers, a very palpable fear for the safety of their
wives and children will.77 "Plata o [pilomo - [s]ilver or []ead - is
the choice facing both local and federal officials, and the threat of
a bullet is no joke."8
The foregoing state of affairs suggests that bad cops ousted
from one jurisdiction can easily resurface in another free of detec-
tion. Given this contamination of once cleanly police ranks, and
the generalized intermingling of good and bad forces, the judicial
need to distinguish cops from criminals is diminishing by the min-
ute. Therefore, good reason exists to err on the side of "official
capacity," and hold the Mexican government, rather than its citi-
zenry, accountable for its disgraceful law enforcement. 9
III. STATUTORY BACKGROUND: THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("Con-
72. See Gunmen, Forces Clash, supra note 61.
73. Emmott, supra note 70.
74. Id.
75. Hawley, supra note 67.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Gritsforbreakfast, Better Border Strategies Needed for Journalist, Witness
Protection, Unmasking Corruption, GRITS FOR BREAKFAST (Dec. 22, 2008, 6:10 AM),
http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2008/12/better-border-strategies-needed-for.
html.
79. See infra Part IV.
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vention Against Torture," "Convention" or "CAT") is an interna-
tional agreement that "requires signatory parties to take
measures to end torture within their territorial jurisdiction and to
criminalize all acts of torture." ° Unlike numerous prior interna-
tional agreements that merely condemned or prohibited torture,
the Convention Against Torture "appears to be the first interna-
tional agreement to actually attempt to define the term.",, It does
so as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture"
means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is suspected of having com-
mitted, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions.82
Considered "[p]erhaps the most notable international agreement
prohibiting torture," the Convention Against Torture has been
signed by the United States and more than 140 other nations. 3
Mexico signed the Convention Against Torture on March 18, 1985
and ratified it soon thereafter on January 23, 1986.4
A. Implementing Legislation in the United States
The United States signed the Convention Against Torture on
April 18, 1988 and subsequently ratified it on October 21, 1994,
"subject to certain declarations, reservations, and understand-
ings."8" Most notably, the United States Senate's consent to ratifi-
80. Michael John Garcia, Cong. Research Serv., RL 32438, U.N. CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE (CAT): OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION TO INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES
(2004).
81. Id.
82. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113-14,
available at http://treaties.un.orgPages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028003d679
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
83. Garcia, supra note 79.
84. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, at 359,
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/26, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.3 (2009).
85. Garcia, supra note 79, at 5.
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cation of the Convention Against Torture was conditioned on the
declaration in its ratifying instruments that Articles 1 through 16
would not be self-executing.88 This precondition to ratification
implied that "implementing legislation was required to fulfill U.S.
international obligations under CAT, and such implementing leg-
islation was necessary for CAT to apply domestically."87
The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998
("FARRA") implements relevant portions of the Convention
Against Torture in the United States.8 This legislation evinces "a
policy not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary
removal of any person to a country where there are substantial
grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being
subjected to torture."89 Furthermore, "U.S. courts hearing cases
concerning the removal of aliens have regularly interpreted CAT
provisions prohibiting alien removal to countries where an alien
would likely face torture to be non-self executing and judicially
unenforceable except to the extent permitted under domestic
implementing legislation."90 Given that American courts will not
enforce the Convention Against Torture beyond the scope of its
implementing legislation in the United States, on what statutory
language can plaintiffs claiming relief under the Convention rely?
B. Relevant FARRA Regulations
Under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against
Torture, "[n]o State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extra-
dite a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being sub-
jected to torture."9 Under the legislation implementing Article 3
in the United States, when determining eligibility for withholding
of removal under the Convention Against Torture, "[tihe burden of
proof is on the applicant ... to establish that it is more likely than
not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed
country of removal."92 When determining the probability that a




88. See id. at n.22.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Convention Against Torture, art. 3, supra note 81, at 114.
92. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (emphasis added).
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[M]ust consider all evidence, including but not limited to:
(1) evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant, (2)
evidence that the applicant could relocate to another part of
the country where he is not likely to be tortured, (3) evi-
dence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights
within the country of removal, and (4) other relevant coun-
try conditions."
In order to determine the likelihood of torturous conditions in
a given nation, a firm statutory definition of who can torture, and
how, is required. "Torture is defined as any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person ... when such pain or suffering is inflicted by
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity."94 The
following section analyzes how various circuit courts have inter-
preted "acting in an official capacity" under the Convention
Against Torture.
IV. "ACTING IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY" AS
"UNDER COLOR OF LAW"
In Ali v. Reno, the Sixth Circuit held that the Convention
Against Torture applies only to torture occurring "in the context of
governmental authority, excluding torture that occurs as a wholly
private act or, in terms more familiar in United States law, it
applies to torture inflicted 'under color of law."'' In an unpub-
lished decision seven years later, the Fifth Circuit applied the
same color-of-law framework to define the scope of coverage
afforded by the Convention Against Torture.96 "To prove entitle-
ment to protection under the CAT, the applicant must demon-
strate that, if removed to his country of origin, it is more likely
than not he would be tortured by, or with the acquiescence of, gov-
ernment officials acting under color of law."97
Although the equation of "in an official capacity" with "under
color of law" is of little import standing alone, this judicial confla-
tion provides the common law foundation for the introduction of
93. Ramirez-Peyro v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 637, 639 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)).
94. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (emphasis added).
95. Ali v. Reno, 237 F.3d 591, 596-97 (6th Cir. 2001).
96. Ahmed v. Mukasey, 300 F. App'x 324, 327-28 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).
97. Id. (emphasis added).
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the operative "sufficient nexus" inquiry.9" Armed with this ana-
lytic tool frequently employed to determine whether an official
acts under color of law,99 American courts now have an effective
solution for Mexican citizens awaiting deportation who under-
standably wish to avoid their homeland's incessant lawlessness
and frustratingly ineffective law enforcement."0
V. LIBERALIZATION OF THE "SUFFICIENT NEXUS" INQUIRY
The color-of-law test can be summarized as follows: "to find
whether an official acts under color of law, we look to see whether
a sufficient nexus exists between the official's public position and
the official's harmful conduct." 1 ' The genesis of the "sufficient
nexus" inquiry is beyond and before the purview of the Convention
Against Torture. In United States v. Price, a deputy sheriff, two
additional police officers, and 15 private individuals participated
in the murders of three prisoners who were released from their
cells in the middle of the night by the deputy sheriff.12 The
Supreme Court held that every individual involved was acting
under color of state law because the actions of each were made
possible by the state detention and the deputy sheriffs calculated
release of the victims.03 Considering that only three of the 18
defendants were identifiable police officers, or "acting under color
of law" in the traditional sense, Price serves as a fairly liberal
starting point for delineating the circumstances that give rise to
state action for color-of-law purposes.
Fourteen years later, the Sixth Circuit held in Layne v. Sam-
pley that the color-of-law determination is a fact-specific
inquiry.04 "Although in certain cases, it is possible to determine
the question whether a person acted under color of state law as a
matter of law, there may remain in some instances 'unanswered
questions of fact regarding the proper characterization of the
actions' for the jury to decide." 105 In finding that the defendant
acted under color of state law, these "unanswered questions of
fact" included that defendant had authority to carry the weapon
98. See United States v. Colbert, 172 F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir. 1999); Roe v. Humke,
128 F.3d 1213, 1216 (8th Cir. 1997).
99. See cases cited supra note 79.
100. See supra Part II.B-C.
101. Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder, 574 F.3d 893, 900 (8th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).
102. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794-96 (1966).
103. Id.
104. See Layne v. Sampley, 627 F.2d 12, 13 (6th Cir. 1980).
105. Id. (citations omitted).
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only because he was a police officer, the argument's genesis was
unquestionably in the performance of police duties, the threat was
received through a police agency, and plaintiff did not know defen-
dant was on vacation when the latter was found with a revolver in
the company of police officers.' °6 Despite the generously inclusive
color-of-law analysis applied in Price,'°' the case-by-case approach
adopted here more closely aligns with the systemic corruption,
and related "official capacity" issues, that pervade contemporary
Mexican law enforcement.'
Bennett v. Pippin is notable for the special weight the Fifth
Circuit accords to information generally only privy to individuals
in law enforcement positions.' 9 The Court held that a sheriffs
action was "under color of state law" where he raped a woman and
used his position to ascertain when her husband would be home,
and threatened to have her thrown in jail if she refused."' Given
how incredibly easy it is for drug cartel hit men to locate protected
witnesses in Mexico,' the obvious conclusion is that an informa-
tion leak clearly exists among those police officers assigned to do
the protecting. The Bennett Court recognizes in its color-of-law
analysis that sheriffs and other public officials perform their
duties from a privileged position of power, and this informed judg-
ment seems well suited to protect Mexican informants from plain-
clothes officers with classified, insider-only knowledge.
In Roe v. Humke, the Eighth Circuit announced the operative
"sufficient nexus" inquiry: "[Whether] a police officer is acting
under color of state law turns on the nature and circumstances of
the officer's conduct and the relationship of that conduct to the
performance of his official duties.""' In this case, the Court deter-
mined that an officer's actions were not under the color of law
where he was not on duty, was not in uniform or wearing his
badge, did not specifically invoke his status, was not in a place
where only officers had authority to be, and did not threaten to
use official authority in the future."' Unlike the Fifth Circuit in
Bennett, the Eighth Circuit here assigns greater weight to tangi-
ble circumstantial factors, including appearance and location,
106. Id.
107. See Price, 383 U.S. at 794-96.
108. See supra Part II.C.
109. See Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 589 (5th Cir. 1996).
110. Id.
111. See supra Part II.B.
112. Roe v. Humke, 128 F.3d 1213, 1216 (8th Cir. 1997).
113. Id.
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tending to evince public recognition of state action. The factors
cited for the outcome in this case suggest that the "sufficient
nexus" inquiry employs a totality of the circumstances analysis,
which harkens back to the fact-specific approach advanced by the
Sixth Circuit in Layne."
4
United States v. Colbert broadens "under color of law" to
encompass actions undertaken by public officials for purely per-
sonal reasons.1 5 The Eighth Circuit held that the defendant's
actions were well within the "color of law" requirement where his
status as a police officer enabled him to be in the restricted area of
a jail, to open a prisoner's cell, to remove the prisoner from the
cell, and also to threaten him with future arrest. 6 Most impor-
tant for the evolution of the "under color of law" doctrine is the
Court's understanding that the fact that defendant was not on
duty at the time, and his motivation was personal, not official, in
that his anger at the prisoner arose from a personal cause, does
"not alter the essence of the case" although it is "certainly not irrel-
evant."117 This formulation of the color-of-law standard, which
holds the state liable for the misconduct of employees even when
they act beyond the scope of their agency powers, contemplates
that public officials will misuse their official capacity to success-
fully pursue purely personal agendas. Although the Mexican gov-
ernment "opposes corruption and collusion with drug cartels at its
highest levels,"'18 considering personal gain as a color-of-law factor
will undoubtedly impute responsibility to Mexico "for the acts of
its officials, including low-level ones, even when those officials act
in contravention of the nation's will.'
' 19
The only wrinkle in this line of jurisprudence is Delcambre v.
Delcambre.2 ° Here, the Fifth Circuit found no action under color
of law where a police chief assaulted his sister-in-law over per-
sonal arguments about family matters, but did not threaten her
with his power to arrest. 21 This decision merely suggests that at
some point a public official's actions become so divorced from his
official capacity that imputing them to the state unfairly mis-
places liability. The location of this point along the liability spec-
114. See Layne, 627 F.2d at 13.
115. See United States v. Colbert, 172 F.3d 594, 596-97 (8th Cir. 1999).
116. Id.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. Ramirez-Peyro, 574 F.3d at 901 (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id.
120. Delcambre v. Delcambre, 635 F.2d 407, 407 (5th Cir. 1981).
121. Id. at 408.
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trum, among other considerations, is discussed in Part VII. 122
VI. THE DECISION: RAMIREZ-PEYRO V. HOLDER
A. Factual Summary
Guillermo Eduardo Ramirez Peyro, a Mexican native and citi-
zen, did not become a confidential informant overnight. After
leaving the Mexican highway police in 1995, he embarked on a
career in drug trafficking by supervising the warehousing and dis-
tribution of large quantities of cocaine in Guadalajara, Mexico.
12 3
Upon becoming a confidential informant for the United States
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") in
2000,124 Ramirez Peyro successfully infiltrated the Juarez Cartel
and facilitated the arrest of some 50 Cartel members by the
United States government. 125 One of these individuals, Heriberto
Santillan, was a high-ranking lieutenant in the Juarez Cartel who
ended up pleading guilty to a drug trafficking charge.126 Along
with serving as a material witness in the United States' prosecu-
tion of Santillan, Ramirez Peyro "gave a statement to representa-
tives of the Mexican government implicating Santillan in the
murders of rival drug traffickers. '"127
Ramirez Peyro's proffer of testimony to the Mexican govern-
ment is likely to be the more dangerous alliance given that gov-
ernment's corrupt administration of law enforcement. 128 Ramirez
Peyro "testified that he witnessed Mexican police officers murder
individuals at the behest of the Cartel, saw Cartel members par-
ticipate in many other killings in the presence of Mexican police
officers, and further witnessed police cover-ups of those crimes."129
Concerned ICE agents warned Ramirez Peyro that his
informant work placed his life in danger.3 0 It is undisputed that
Ramirez Peyro's collaboration with the United States government
has resulted in the commission of two attempts on his life. 3' Fol-
lowing the second attempted assassination, the United States
122. See infra Part VII.
123. Ramirez-Peyro v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 637, 638 (8th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter
Gonzales].
124. Id.
125. Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder, 574 F.3d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 2009).
126. Gonzales, 477 F.3d at 638.
127. Id.
128. See generally supra Part II.C.
129. Ramirez-Peyro, 574 F.3d at 895.
130. See Gonzales, 477 F.3d at 639.
131. Ramirez-Peyro, 574 F.3d at 895.
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placed Ramirez Peyro into protective custody in 2004, provided
him with immunity from prosecution by the United States govern-
ment, and temporarily paroled he and his family into the country
"for their safety."1 32 Despite Ramirez Peyro's parole into the
United States, he was never admitted within the meaning of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, and accordingly, he "was placed
into expedited removal proceedings when his parole permit
expired on January 14, 2005."1 3' The Department of Homeland
Security initiated the noted action against Ramirez Peyro on May
9, 2005 when it "issued a Notice to Appear charging [him] with
being subject to removal under section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) on the ground that he
was an applicant for admission not in possession of a valid immi-
gration document. ' 34
B. Controversy and Opposing Arguments
Ramirez Peyro conceded that he was removable,1 35 and before
an immigration judge on June 9, 2005, further conceded that he
had trafficked drugs in Mexico, which therefore rendered him
ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. 136 In the alter-
native, Ramirez Peyro "maintained that he was entitled to defer-
ral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, which
contains no so [sic] such bar on the basis of prior criminal activ-
ity."1' 7 Ramirez Peyro supported his prayer for CAT relief by
claiming fear of torture and death "at the hands of the Juarez Car-
tel and Mexican law enforcement acting on the cartel's behalf."138
Succinctly stated, the issue in the instant case is whether
Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture pro-
hibited the removal of Ramirez Peyro from the United States to
Mexico upon the expiration of his parole permit.3 '
In reversing the October 11, 2007 findings of the Immigration
Judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") concluded that
since Ramirez Peyro had been offered immunity from prosecution
by the Mexican government, "there would be no legal basis upon
which Mexican law-enforcement officials could detain Ramirez
132. Id. at 896.
133. Id.
134. Gonzales, 477 F.3d at 638 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)).
135. Id. at 638.
136. Id. at 639 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii).
137. Id. at 639.
138. Id. at 638.
139. See Ramirez-Peyro, 574 F.3d at 895.
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Peyro under the pretense of law."14° Accordingly, the BIA opined
that any commission, consent, or acquiescence to torture by Mexi-
can officials would be the result of "a purely personal pursuit,
completely unrelated to the law enforcement powers and responsi-
bilities entrusted to them by Mexico."141
Ramirez Peyro countered that "even assuming the BIA cor-
rectly determined the legal standard for 'acting in an official
capacity,' it too narrowly construed that standard and erred in
applying that standard to the facts because the BIA's non-official-
capacity determination was based on improper fact finding and a
misstatement of the IJ's factual findings regarding the likelihood




The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Ramirez
Peyro, finding that "[i]n focusing only on the likelihood of whether
Ramirez Peyro would be taken into official custody, then, the BIA
disregarded the other relevant findings to the color-of-law analy-
sis and could not have properly applied the law."4
VII. THE RAMIREZ-PEYRO COURT "GETS" THE CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE AND CONTEMPORARY
MEXICAN REALITY
A. Liberalized Sufficient Nexus Inquiry Comports
with both Article 1 and FARRA
Under Article 1, the Convention Against Torture only
becomes operative when the challenged "pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquies-
cence of a public official or other person acting in an official capac-
ity."44 The italicized portions suggest that the drafters of the
Convention maintained an expansive view of what constituted a
140. Id. at 898-99. It is noteworthy that Ramirez Peyro's alleged immunity from
prosecution by the Mexican government is conspicuously contested. See id. at 896.
Since there was no written documentation of the grant of immunity from Mexican
prosecution or any details of that purported offer in the record, the Immigration
Judge merely "determined that Ramirez Peyro believed there was some agreement."
Id. (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 898.
142. Id. at 901.
143. Id. at 903.
144. Convention Against Torture, supra note 81 (emphasis added).
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sufficient link between the alleged torturous conduct and those
responsible for its commission. To wit, the specific words chosen
capture active as well as passive conduct on the behalf of "official"
actors, and a commitment to the basic principles of agency law.
Given that the drafters of the FARRA legislation opted to imple-
ment the quoted portion of Article 1 verbatim in the United
States,4 ' they must have agreed with the United Nations' liberal
construction.
Ramirez-Peyro marks the first time the Eighth Circuit adopts
"in an official capacity" to mean "under color of law" in its body of
jurisprudence dedicated to the implementation of the Convention
Against Torture.'46 This represents a judicial innovation, if not
bona fide breakthrough, for this St. Louis, Missouri-based circuit
court. More to the point, the Eighth Circuit's formulation of a
nexus inquiry is rightfully cognizant of and sympathetic to the
"lose-lose" scenario that afflicts individuals removed to Mexico,
where the distinction between cops and criminals is tragically
blurry.'47
As a corollary, the judiciary should employ a fluid conception
of state action that is mindful of the difficult inquiry of who in
Mexico is and is not acting "under color of law." In Ramirez-Peyro,
the Eighth Circuit already demonstrated this need for flexibility
by defining its nexus inquiry as "necessarily fact intensive."148
Furthermore, by intentionally excluding from its nexus inquiry
the requirement that the "public official be executing official state
policy or that the public official be the nation's president or some
other official at the upper echelons of power," 49 the Court recog-
nizes the practical reality that lip service policies promulgated at
the highest levels of Mexican government are demonstrably
estranged from the corrupt proclivities of police officers and other
low-level officials.
B. The Sufficient Nexus Inquiry at Work: A Case
Study
Working through the enumerated factors of the sufficient
nexus inquiry applied in Ramirez-Peyro demonstrates the frame-
work's commitment to Article 1 and its significant potential to
145. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).
146. Ramirez-Peyro, 574 F.3d at 900.
147. See supra Part II.




produce positive results for Mexican citizens. In the context of
police officers, the sufficient nexus inquiry "includes considera-
tions such as whether the officers are on duty and in uniform, the
motivation behind the officers' actions, and whether the officers
had access to the victim because of their positions, among
others."150
As a result of the Eighth Circuit's conflation of "in an official
capacity" with "under color of law," the sufficient nexus inquiry
played an instrumental role in withholding Ramirez Peyro's pend-
ing removal to Mexico. Both the immigration judge and BIA
agreed that "people within the Mexican law enforcement commu-
nity" would harm Ramirez Peyro."' They arrived at this conclu-
sion based on substantial evidence in the record tending to
suggest that Mexican officials would either directly harm Ramirez
Peyro themselves or place him in the hands of vengeful Cartel
members." 2 Without the lens of the sufficient nexus inquiry, the
fact that the Cartel's ranks perhaps included the same police
officers who would initially harm him would be of no import for
CAT purposes.5 ' Furthermore, the sufficient nexus inquiry
illuminates one compelling finding of the immigration judge in
favor of withholding removal. Since Ramirez Peyro "'would be
submitted to the normal deportation process' from the United
States, Mexican officials would have information about his return
- information only obtainable by virtue of their government posi-
tions - and, using that information, 'would make his presence
known to the cartel.
''15 4
The beneficial use of the sufficient nexus inquiry can be
observed in other contexts. Recall the December 2009 assassina-
tion of Edgar Bayardo, the "former high-ranking federal police
official whose information led to [the 2008] indictment of Mexico's
federal police chief and other top cops for alleged narco-corrup-
tion. "1" Would a court applying Ramirez-Peyro's sufficient nexus
inquiry determine that Bayardo would be tortured under Article 1
of the Convention Against Torture, and therefore entitled to the
protections of Article 3?156
The first factor, "whether the officers are on duty and in uni-
150. Id.




155. Padgett, supra note 5.
156. This exercise assumes, of course, that the torture was contemplated rather
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form,"157 reflects a judicial determination that it is reasonable for
civilians to hold the government liable for the actions of those
individuals who hold themselves out as and purport to be identifi-
able law enforcement officers. This factor is clearly missing here
as Bayardo was "fatally riddled with bullets by two hit men
dressed in suits."' Assuming those suits were not police uniforms
or otherwise indicative of membership in a law enforcement
agency, Bayardo would not be able to raise this argument as a
factor tending to establish a sufficient nexus between the assas-
sins' "public position" and their harmful conduct.
Addressing "the motivation behind the officers' actions" dis-
tinguishes employment-related duties from "purely personal pur-
suit[s]."159 Most likely, the two hit men were ordered to visit
Bayardo in order to prevent him from further providing "crucial
testimony not only regarding drug trafficking, but also about links
between federal police bosses and Sinaloa capos."160 Unlike in Del-
cambre v. Delcambre, where the Fifth Circuit found no action
under color of law where a police chief assaulted his sister-in-law
in response to personal arguments over family matters, 6' the hit
men appear to have been motivated by nothing more than busi-
ness concerns. After all, the two assailants exited the Starbucks
just as calmly and nonchalantly as they entered.'62 Ignoring for
the moment that Bayardo's executioners never purported to be
anything but paid assassins, Bayardo would still encounter diffi-
culty claiming that the hit men's actions exceeded the boundaries
of their agency relationship.
Since the factors in a totality analysis are necessarily disjunc-
tive, the absence of the above two does not automatically end the
inquiry. If anything, the lynchpin of the sufficient nexus analysis
is "whether the officers had access to the victim because of their
positions."'63 "Access by badge" was the dispositive factor in
United States v. Price, where the Supreme Court determined that
15 private individuals involved in the murders of three prisoners
acted under color of state law since their actions were facilitated
than actual, and that at all relevant times Bayardo was held in the United States
pending removal to Mexico.
157. Ramirez-Peyro, 574 F.3d at 901.
158. Padgett, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
159. See Ramirez-Peyro, 574 F.3d at 904 (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. Padgett, supra note 5.
161. Delcambre, 635 F.2d at 408.
162. Padgett, supra note 5.
163. See Ramirez-Peyro, 574 F.3d at 901.
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by the state detention of the victims and a deputy sheriffs pre-
meditated decision to release them.16
The Mexican government vowed to investigate Bayardo's
murder with a presumed keen eye toward uncovering whether the
assassination was an inside job.165 Specifically, investigators
allegedly will focus on "whether any officers inside the witness-
protection program itself tipped off cartel bosses as to [Bayardo's]
movements and whereabouts." 16  Given the generalized failure of
Mexican witness-protection programming,167 it is highly probable
that investigators will discover an inside leak. In that event,
Bayardo would likely be able to successfully argue that but for the
access the witness-protection program vested in these crooked
officers, the cartels would not have discovered his location, and he
would consequently still be living. Although the sufficient nexus
inquiry, as given expression to by the Eighth Circuit, 61 only
applies to officials acting under color of law, the foregoing discus-
sion suggests that the framework is even flexible enough to hold
corrupt public officials accountable for their actions that directly
or indirectly result in harmful conduct.
C. The United States Is Still Drug Informants' Best
Bet
Short of momentous institutional upheaval, 69 the American
judiciary may be the safest resort for government-cooperating
aliens now facing deportation to Mexico. Simply put, Mexican wit-
ness-protection programming is not secure enough to foster any
meaningful sense of confidence among participants, 70 and Mexi-
can law enforcement officers empirically cannot be trusted to pro-
tect informants from the nationwide reach of the drug cartels. 7'
164. See Price, 383 U.S. at 794-96.
165. See Padgett, supra note 5.
166. Id.
167. See supra Part II.B.
168. See Ramirez-Peyro, 574 F.3d at 900.
169. E.g., the complete cessation of the United States-backed War on Drugs. After
Mexican naval troops killed Antonio Ezequiel Cardenas Guillen, the high ranking
leader of the Gulf drug cartel, in November 2010, United States President Barack
Obama called to congratulate his Mexican counterpart and renew his support for the
latter's efforts to "end the impunity of organized criminal groups." Gunmen, Forces
Clash, supra note 61 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although friendly enough,
gestures like these serve as a constant reminder to Mexican authorities that their
responses to the drug war are being closely scrutinized by the United States.
170. See supra Part II.B.
171. See supra Part II.C.
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With that knowledge, American courts can best protect the safety
of Mexican witnesses under the United Nations Convention
Against Torture by deferring, canceling, or otherwise judicially
impeding the pending removal of these individuals to Mexico. In
order to effect this humanitarian policy choice that is certainly
consistent with American notions of justice, the federal courts
must embrace the liberalized color-of-law analysis heralded in
Ramirez-Peyro to presumptively find state action whenever
possible.
The unfortunate reality that violence and corruption levels in
Mexico have not demonstrably improved in recent years played an
instrumental role in reaching this conclusion. A November 2010
account asserts that "[slince December 2006, when Calderon
launched his crackdown, more than 31,000 people have been
killed across Mexico in drug-related violence."'72 Faced with
choosing between the relative stability and institutional integrity
of the United States judiciary and a possible yet improbable turn-
around in Mexican affairs, this author's money is unquestionably
on the former.
Recognition of the frailty, and ultimate futility, of Mexican
domestic efforts to protect informants is not a novel criticism.
Back in December of 2008, one Texas commentator speculated
that
[P]erhaps the United States, as Mexico's partner, could
assist by establishing a robust witness protection program
whereby police and others who turn in their cartel handlers
or citizens who rat out corrupt cops could actually come live
in America with their family, not just until they were
required to testify but as long as they continue to be in
danger."'
The foregoing points to the United States as a true place of refuge
for those individuals daring enough to cross the Mexican cartels.
The factual narrative chronicling Ramirez Peyro's transformation
into confidential informant strongly suggests that the United
States is the only safe space for him, his family, and others simi-
larly situated.
D. How to Withhold Removal Post-Ramirez-Peyro
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder sug-
172. Emmott, supra note 70.
173. Gritsforbreakfast, supra note 77.
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gests the applicant's burden of proof for successfully withholding
removal under the Convention Against Torture. The applicant
must establish that, if removed to the proposed country of
removal, 17 4 it is more likely than not that he or she would be sub-
jected to any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physi-
cal or mental, is intentionally inflicted, 7 5 when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of an official whose harmful conduct has a broad
sufficient nexus to his or her public position.'76 The nexus inquiry
contained in the final clause is fact-specific and demands a liberal
construction.'77 This articulation of the brilliant defense crafted
by Ramirez Peyro's counsel takes into consideration Article 3 of
the Convention Against Torture, relevant FARRA implementing
regulations, and the Eighth Circuit's humanitarian policy
concerns.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Apparently, the one caveat to Ramirez-Peyro is that the deci-
sion "is temporary and can be reversed 'should the Mexican gov-
ernment make significant inroads in its battle against drug
cartels and corruption.""78 As prior sections suggest, however,
this contingency is simply unlikely. Unless and until the Mexican
government regains true control of its law enforcement, Ramirez-
Peyro should be read to presumptively find torturous conditions
entitling a claimant to withholding of removal to Mexico.
Although the impact of Ramirez-Peyro "on other deportation
and even asylum cases for Mexican nationals remains unclear, " "'
Daniel Kowalski, an immigration lawyer from Austin, Texas, is
convinced that the ruling will likely "encourage immigration law-
yers to raise the claim (of torture) more often and with more confi-
dence."180 If this proves to be the case, cooperating government
witnesses will have an effective tool for preventing near-certain
deportation, and will no longer have to endure corrupt law
enforcement practices in Mexico. After all, in order to avoid
deportation under Ramirez-Peyro, the applicant must simply
prove that "he would be tortured 'either directly by government
174. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).
175. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).
176. See Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder, 574 F.3d 893, 900 (8th Cir. 2009).
177. See id. at 901.
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agents or indirectly by government agents turning him over to the
cartel,"""' which is a rather light burden to carry given the perva-
sive corruption in Mexican law enforcement.'82
Sometime in the fall of 2009, shortly after the Eighth Circuit
withheld his removal to Mexico, Ramirez Peyro told NPR that soli-
tary confinement, where he had been for more than five years, was
favorable to the fate he faced in Mexico."8 3 During his phone con-
versations with NPR in Spanish, he clarified that his primary goal
was to stay out of "the hands of the people who are going to try
and kill me."" Ramirez Peyro may have realized his goal on April
8, 2010, when Jodi Goodwin, his attorney of five years who suc-
cessfully argued against his removal to Mexico in the noted case,
confirmed that he had been released from the Buffalo Federal
Detention Center.
185
At the time of Ramirez Peyro's release, law enforcement
sources "were not aware of any U.S.-government sponsored secur-
ity assistance being provided to him.' ' 6 Although the freed
informant is unquestionably safer in upstate New York than any-
where in Mexico, "[t]he word will already be out to the cartel about
his release because of [its] prison snitches."18 7 As expected, Good-
win refused to provide any information concerning her former cli-
ent's latest whereabouts.' Even if Ramirez Peyro eventually
turns up dead and her efforts were all for naught, they will cer-
tainly not go unrecognized in the annals of immigration law.
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